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Abstract
Finnegans Wake presents a semiotic dilemma for the reader: How is it that the Wake means anything? And, Why 
doesn't it mean everything? To gesture, somewhat metonymically, toward the Wake itself:
It is told in sounds in utter that, in signs so adds to, in universal, in polygluttural, in each auxiliary neutral idiom, 
sordomutics, florilingua, sheltafocal, flayflutter, a con's cubane, a pro's tutute, strassarab, ereperse and anythongue 
athall. [FW 117.12-16]
As such, Finnegans Wake lays bare the dilemma of semiotics in general: that is, the problem of signification and 
indeterminacy of meaning.
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SEMIOTIC PERTURBATIONS:  
WHAT THE FROG'S EYE TELLS US ABOUT 
FINNEGANS WAKE 
Finnegans Wake presents a semiotic dilemma for the reader: How is it that the Wake means 
anything? And, Why doesn't it mean everything? To gesture, somewhat metonymically, toward the 
Wake itself: 
It is told in sounds in utter that, in signs so adds to, in universal, in polygluttural, in each auxiliary neutral idiom, 
sordomutics, florilingua, sheltafocal, flayflutter, a con's cubane, a pro's tutute, strassarab, ereperse and anythongue 
athall. [FW 117.12-16] 
As such, Finnegans Wake lays bare the dilemma of semiotics in general: that is, the problem of 
signification and indeterminacy of meaning. 
One can certainly argue that the Wake holds a privileged position in Umberto Eco's theory of 
semiotics, serving as an important example of meaning-making in several of his texts. For Eco, 
Finnegans Wake produces a textual network of associations that makes the work's cultural and 
psychological context legible. The lexeme "meandertale," for example, produces other lexemes, all 
interconnected by a network of associations, each reinforcing the other, at the expense of other 
possible associative links (Limits 142). Nodes, while temporary in their arrangement, are reinforced 
by the actual activation of a semiotic relation--in the instance of a literary object, by the act of 
reading. Reading becomes a kind of "bootstrapping" in which meaning becomes increasingly 
determinate through a process Eco calls amalgamation. In addressing any given node within a 
semiotic network "the reader does not know as yet which of these virtual properties must be 
actualized. This decision will be helped only by further amalgamation and by textual operators" (Role 
18). While Eco emphasizes that these semiotic networks place sign-functions in a temporary 
arrangement via a code, the articulation of a semiotic network by way of that code gives rise to a 
structure of increasing determination. At the same time that the network of interconnected sign-
functions becomes increasingly complex as a semiotic system, as a communicative system, 
signification remains a linear process of increasing determination. In this sense, the communicative 
actualization of the text through reading amounts to a semiotic determination of linkages by way of a 
code. 
In Eco's semiotics, then, what determines signification is the potential to convey semantic units by 
way of a code. To the extent that a reader "takes up" a code, that reader is involved in a 
communicative system, namely the text. The reader performs as a receiver, commanding and 
controlling sign-functions through the operation of a code that activates or represses linkages with 
other sign-functions. The Model Reader, then, stands not as a person per se, but rather, "a textually 
established set of felicity conditions...to be met in order to have a macro-speech act (such as a text 
is) fully actualized" (Role 11). For Eco, the semiotic process of amalgamation is an actualization of a 
virtual encyclopedia, or "semantic store" (Role 23). One can determine, then, according to Eco, the 
semiotic value of a given Wakean word not by claims to authorial intent, but by the felicity conditions 
that allow this network to "fire."  
Eco's amalgamations describe and inscribe a process that moves from undetermined potential--a 
semiotic virtual--to communicative determination. But it is this linearity of determination and 
actualization that strikes me as problematic, specifically in reference to readings of Finnegans Wake, 
but more generally as an account of the relation between the virtual and the actual in the production 
of meaning. The temporal linearity of reading and speaking lends credence to an understanding of 
dynamic semiotic processes as spatially linear, what George Lakoff refers to as a conduit fallacy of 
communication. One of the main problems with this conduit view of communication is that it treats 
words as things, in the form of semantic units, conveyed to a receiver by way of a vehicle or 
medium. In effect, the concept of a lexicon, and more generally the system of language, falls victim 
to a second-order container fallacy, understood as a kind of holding place for this set of units, which 
are then pulled out and concatenated to make sense. Granted, Eco maintains that signs express 
transitory correlations between expression and content, articulated by a conventional code; but his 
emphasis on the code insures that meaning-making progresses in one particular direction, that is: 
toward the full actualization of the Model Reader. While this approach provides a solution of sorts to 
the semiotic dilemma of Finnegans Wake (why "meandertale" signifies something, but not 
everything), it does so within a context that presupposes an ideal of full and complete conveyance in 
the form of a full and complete actualization of the text. The question I would pose, then, would be: 
Can we account for the dynamic processes of meaning making, without recourse to some version of 
the conduit fallacy of communication?  
To address this dilemma, but to avoid the linear determinations suggested by Eco's semiotics, I 
would like to draw on the field of autopoietic theory and apply it to semiotics in general, and more 
specifically to a reading of meaning-making in Finnegans Wake. Starting in the late 1950s, a number 
of researchers in the emerging field of cybernetics began to challenge the dominant computational 
notion of cognition--that information processing occurred through a rule-governed linear 
manipulation of symbols. These researchers began to formulate an image of cognition as an 
emergent co-functioning of interconnected neural systems (Varela et al. 85-87). Lettvin, Maturana, 
McCulloch, and Pitts's 1959 study of vision in frogs serves as an oft-cited landmark shift in cognitive 
science from computational models to connectionist models of cognition. Their research results, 
published in a paper entitled "What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain," suggest that instead of 
producing a one-to-one correlation of the visual field's light intensity, the four parallel neural paths 
from the frog's eye to the frog's brain respond to specific modes of stimulation, including the 
(preferably jerky) movement of small, convex objects, such as flies. They conclude that rather than 
functioning as an input device that translates the visual field into a map of light intensities, "the eye 
speaks to the brain in a language already highly organized and interpreted," and does so in a way 
such that stimulation always occurs within an environmental context (251, 253).  
Experiments with the frog's eye suggest that rather than providing a phenomenal grasping at the 
noumenal world, the frog's cognition is defined as a structural fit to an external environment, in which 
erratically moving, small convex objects signify. Humberto Maturana would build on this early work in 
the 1970's and 1980's to develop his autopoietic theory of cognition. Instead of defining cognition as 
a process whereby a living being creates or retrieves a mental representation of an "object reality," 
autopoietic theory understands cognition as an enactive process, in which a structural coupling 
between an embodied perceiver and a world "brought forth" through "perceptually-guided" action 
determines both potential and actual action--what I would call tentatively the structure of the virtual 
(Varela et al. 173). This structural coupling enacts a kind of homeostasis that delimits the perceiver 
as a unity with reference to its environment. The unity itself, while homeostatic, is also held in unity 
by its functional response to the process of being in an environment. As Maturana describes system 
"unity," it amounts to a virtuality of sorts, defined by both a range of "perturbations" the system can 
accept, as well as a range of possible state responses to perturbation. As a system responds to an 
actual perturbation, it results in an actual change in state, which in turn defines a new virtuality for 
the system. A unity will respond to its environment through this successful redefinition of its virtuality, 
or it will cease to exist as a unity ("Cognition" 39). Structural coupling, then, describes a process 
whereby a unity successfully delimits a field of possible responses to its environment. While a given 
environmental perturbation (a fly flitting by and lighting on a leaf) produces an actualized state 
change (the flick of a tongue), such an event, also alters that system's virtuality, that is, the frog's 
field of possible responses to its environment. 
So what, then, does the frog's eye tell us about Finnegans Wake? 
Autopoietic theory provides a mapping of the actual and the virtual in a way that I find quite useful for 
overcoming both the conduit fallacy of communication and an understanding of meaning-making as 
an operation of semantic units drawn from a container-like lexicon. Such an approach demands that 
we rethink why a "polygluttural" phrase such as /anythongue athall/ signifies <<anything at all>> but 
not //anything at all//. From the standpoint of Eco's semiotics, unlimited semeoisis would entail a 
process of increasing determination of a sign series through greater control over a semiotic network. 
The Model Reader enacts these nodes "completely," or rather, amalgamates the virtuality of the text 
into an actual reading that optimizes this network of resonances:  the bifurcated semantic units 
<<anything at all>> and <<any tongue at all>>. This amalgamation would converge with other 
lexemes in the sequence in which tongues and plentitude resonate (polygluttural, florilingua). 
Although the phrase is never fully determined, according to Eco, reading moves the sign chain in 
that direction. This sort of reading stands in opposition to Derrida's reading of two words in the 
Wake, in which the chain of signification always opens toward increasing indetermination. Reading, 
Derrida suggests, enacts a set of dissipative connections, such that any convergence (anything/any 
tongue) increases the virtuality of a semiotic network, rather than amalgamating actual links. In 
contrast to either reading of sign-chains, however, a dynamic, autopoietic model would address how 
semantic unities are articulated in the production of boundaries between a text system and its 
semiotic environment. Rather than mapping signification as a conveyance--from one sign to the 
next--an autopoietic semiotics would treat each enaction of meaning-making as a response that 
establishes a set of virtual and actual signifying potentials for a semantic unit within an environment, 
brought forth through a semiotic structural coupling in the form of reading. 
As such, a Wakean phrase such as  "anythongue athall" maps a virtual range of signification that is 
actualized at the moment of reading. Rather than thinking of this virtuality as a "semantic store," that 
is, as a kind of container of signification, autopoietic theory would suggest that the structure of the 
virtual is itself articulated at the moment of reading. To speak of a sign chain, then, would be to 
construct an artificial theoretical construct, since it is the semiotic environment itself that alters, 
through a structural coupling with each dynamic moment of meaning-making. Eco's famous network 
map of associations for "meandertale," then, presents as a stable structure what would amount to a 
singular event-response to a semiotic perturbation. The stability suggested by Eco would have more 
to do with homeostasis than with increasing determination. "Felicity," then, is not a measure of the 
increasing determination of a Model Reader, but rather, the ability of a signifying system to maintain 
itself in the face of semiotic perturbations, and the resulting meaning-making that occurs through the 
event of semiosis. As such, aberrant associations hold no different status than so-called valid 
associative links: either the communicative system of the text responds to the semiotic perturbation, 
or it collapses. Can "anythongue athall" respond to a semiotic perturbation that actualizes <<thong>> 
as a semantic unit, set against <<concubine>> and <<prostitute>>? Such a reading, while abhorrent 
to Eco's semiotic, is nevertheless "valid" as a potential perturbation; the only limiting case in a 
dynamic semiotics would be the condition of homeostasis, namely the semantic unity's ability to 
assert its boundary within a communicative environment. Once that boundary condition has been 
breeched, semiosis ceases not because a chain has been broken, but because that condition of 
homeostasis has collapsed. 
While traditional semiotics has held forth "the chain" as a spatial metaphor, a dynamic semiotic 
understood in autopoietic terms would best be described as a recursive loop. Peirce himself 
describes unlimited semiosis as "an endless series of representations, each representing the one 
behind it...[having] an absolute object as its limit" (qtd. in Eco, Theory 69). But within the framework 
of autopoiesis, instead of an "endless series," semiosis would be an ongoing self-adjustment that 
establishes a boundary condition between the object of representation and its interpretant. In Niklas 
Luhmann's reading of autopoiesis, actualization implies an "enforced selectivity" that creates units 
within the operations of a system though autopoietic recursion, and as such maps a relation between 
virtual operations and actualized elements and relations (82-83). In the frozen moment of analysis, 
one can account for a structural or systematic determination of signs as actual units, yet in process 
autopoiesis describes meaning making as a recursive loop--a continual rearticulation of a semiotic 
field of possibles within a communicative context. Furthermore, autopoietic theory would suggest 
that language itself  is continually articulated as a virtuality with each actual, communicative 
enunciation. 
In a dynamic semiotic, the lexeme is an event that delimits itself to define itself within a 
communicative context--a productive adjustment in response to a semiotic perturbation. Codes, 
then, would not precede signification, but rather, would be artifacts of sorts marking these moments 
of structural coupling. One could argue, then, that a Wakean phrase such as "gobblydumped 
turkery" presents a semiotic perturbation that enacts <<gobble>> and <<turkey>> as semantic 
unities, each defined within the other's field of possible semiotic perturbations. But in a reading of the 
entire passage, "Every person, place and thing in the chaosmos of Alle anyway connected with the 
gobblydumped turkery was moving and changing every part of the time," a dynamic semiotic must 
also account for a stabilization resulting in the semantic unity <<gobbledegook>>, a phrase coined 
by Texas Congressman Maury Maverick in 1944 (FW 118.21-23). While a coding of "authorial 
intention" would exclude this stabilization, Eco's guiding principle of textual coherence would suggest 
including such a reading since the text as a whole justifies this amalgamation. A dynamic semiotic 
would agree; but rather than gesturing toward a superceding cultural code, autopoietic theory would 
instead suggest that it is through a stabilization of resonant perturbations that the coherence of the 
text as a whole emerges, not the other way around. Meaning, then, maps a dynamic of this process 
of temporary stabilization--a homeostatic adjustment to the distress of semiosis. 
The nodes that Eco sets up for a Wakean word like "meandertale" do not, then, map a code that 
makes the Wake culturally legible; they index an actualization of semiotic boundary conditions 
between these semantic unities and a communicative context. This difference in the relation 
between code and sign-function is an important distinction between traditional semiotics and a 
dynamic, autopoietic theory of meaning-making. As Peter Andersen notes, dynamic semiotics 
provides an explanation for how language maintains stability even though it is "distributed over 
millions of independent language users that ostensibly have neither the knowledge nor the practical 
means for controlling it" ("Dynamic 164).  Since dynamic semiotic systems are recursive, in which 
individual systems define their own boundary conditions based upon perturbations within a 
communicative context, we can no longer define language or a "semantic store" as out there; rather, 
it is structured as a complex attractor, displaying emergent patterns that approximate stable forms 
(Andersen, "Dynamic" 175). A dynamic semiotics denies the role of superstructural codes, 
suggesting instead that global meaning emerges through an enacted pattern of responses to 
perturbations, which then recursively define a new field of possible semiotic responses. Code 
matters less than the pull toward stability enacted in response to a semiotic perturbation, what 
mathematical modeling describes as an attractor or a topological deformation (Anderson, "Dynamic" 
195). Any act of reading enacts a semiotic crisis that either resolves itself through an enforced 
selectivity that produces stable semantic unities, or it results in a dissipation of the structural 
coupling between the reader and the text. In effect, as Andersen notes, "signs stabilize thoughts, not 
merely express them" ("Dynamic" 183-184). What resists--or allows--for the actualization of /thong/ 
within a reading of <<anythongue athall>> would be the pull of that sign as a stabilizing structure. 
And in turn, the pull of a sign toward these moments of stability becomes a measure of the virtuality 
enacted by the production of these semantic unities.  
An autopoietic semiotics to some degree also reverses our assumptions about the relation between 
a communicative context and sign functions. As Andersen notes, "the perturbing environment is 
articulated by the perturbed system--not the other way around as one should expect" ("Semiotics" 
33). If we were to carry out this concept of structural coupling to its limit, we would have to conclude 
that not only does the reader alter in response to the Wake, but also Finnegans Wake itself 
responds to these readings by altering its virtuality. As a system, the work itself produces a 
boundary, one that is perturbed by the reader. The Wake responds to the perturbations its 
environment--in this instance, the actual reading from amidst a structure of possible readings--in 
such a way that its responses maintain its semiotic boundaries. In doing so, autopoietic theory would 
suggest that the virtuality of the text shifts in relation to its environment. While it seems somewhat 
commonplace to declare that reading changes the reader, autopoietic theory maintains the 
seemingly bizarre argument that reading Finnegans Wake changes the Wake itself. It seems 
counter-intuitive to argue that after reading "anythongue athall" somehow that phrase has been 
"perturbed." OK, so I publish a piece here in HJS, read by a dozen or so Joyceans, who then 
encounter my reading of this passage. Perhaps then I could say that my own reading perturbs these 
words in a way that influences future readings. But autopoiesis suggests an even more radical idea: 
that if we are to consider semiotic systems as dynamic, then we must accept that the communicative 
environment itself is dynamic and self-reproducing as its own system. But is this claim any more 
audacious than the claim that language, as an emergent system, is perturbed by the language use 
of individual speakers? The text maintains its unity to the extent that its virtual structure allows for 
the semiotic perturbations of a range of readers that stand in structural coupling to the text. As such, 
any reading of the Wake threatens to collapse the text as a communicative system, unless the 
virtuality of the text can accommodate the semiotic perturbations of its reader. I need not share a 
single "interpretation" of the text with another  reader; any felicitous reading would mean that a 
homeostatic adjustment toward stability has occurred, thereby restructuring the text's potential for 
future structural couplings and future possible readings. 
If we think of the Wake as a system of codings that the reader then decodes, we are forced into a 
relation to semiotic processes that is likewise dependent upon a mode of coding and decoding. I 
suggest instead that a dynamic semiotics would treat the Wake as a process that exposes the role of 
perturbations in the production of meaning, as well as the necessity of a system to compensate for 
perturbations by reaching moments of semantic stability. Such an approach makes an effort to come 
to terms with the semiotic dilemma of Finnegans Wake by explaining how the text manages to mean 
<<anythongue athall>> without dissipating entirely as either a textual system in its own right, or a 
communicative context for reading. 
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